



# Swarm Engineering for Real-world applications

out of the lab and into the real world

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
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# This Talk

- The problem of taking swarm robotics from the laboratory into the real-world
  - How can we design swarm intelligence in a methodologically rigorous way?
  - Swarm Engineering
- In four parts:
  - (Structured) Swarm Engineering
  - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
  - Reliability Modelling
  - Swarm system test and verification

# Real-world Applications

- At the time of writing there is only one known real-world application of swarm robotics
  - A swarm of autonomous parachutes for delivering supplies
    - the *Onyx* parachutes swarm to maintain proximity so that they will not be widely dispersed on landing
    - see <http://www.gizmag.com/go/6285/>



# What is a *Dependable Swarm*?

- It is a complex distributed system, designed using the *Swarm Intelligence* paradigm, which meets *standards* of analysis, design and test that would give sufficient confidence that the system could be employed in critical applications
  - Q: What are these standards?
  - A: They don't exist
- The purpose of our current work is to develop a framework for the analysis, design and test of dependable swarms
- I call this framework *Swarm Engineering*

# Assurance of Dependability


Analysis

Design


Test

- What makes swarm engineered systems different?
  - System functionality achieved through emergence
  - Swarms are dynamical, stochastic, non-linear systems
  - *Task completion* becomes very hard to define.


# Designing the Swarm



# (Structured) Swarm Engineering




# (Dynamic) Data Flow Diagram





# Single Robot Processes



# Provably Stable Behaviour-based Control

- We extend Lyapunov stability theory to second-order stability theorems
  - then use the partial subsumption relationship between the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> order Lyapunov stability theorems as the basis for a formal model of the subsumption architecture

$$\dot{W}(t) \geq 0 \wedge \dot{W}(t) < \bar{W}_{max} \wedge \ddot{W}(t) < \bar{\bar{W}}_{max} < 0$$

Network Behaviour

$$\dot{W}(t) < 0$$

Avoidance Behaviour


S

Colony-style control architecture


Actuators

# Direct Lyapunov Design

- We use the 2<sup>nd</sup> order Lyapunov stability theorems as the basis for a design procedure for the motor schema of a behaviour module



# Swarm modelling and analysis






# Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

- Enumerate each possible hazard:
  - internal and external (environmental)
- Consider the effect of each hazard on each swarm behaviour
- For our swarm robot system there are no system-wide components or structures
  - thus we need to consider only individual robot internal faults

# Case Study: Swarm Containment

- Swarm taxis towards a beacon
- Introduce occluding obstacles
  - The swarm finds its way between the narrow obstacles
- Beacon containment...



# Single robot: failure modes

<i>Hazard</i>	<i>Description</i>
H1	Motor failure
H2	Communications failure
H3	Avoidance Sensor failure
H4	Object Sensor failure
H5	Control Systems failure
H6	All Systems failed

# Failure Effects

	<i>Failure Effect</i>
E1	Motor failure impedes the translational motion of the swarm (anchors the swarm)
E2	Lost robot(s) loose in the environment
E3	Robot collisions with obstacles or target




# Failure Modes and Effects

<i>Swarm Behaviour</i>	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	H6
Aggregation	-	E2	-	-	E2	-
Ad-hoc Network	-	E2	-	-	E2	-
Object Taxis	E1	E2	-	-	E1	-
Obstacle Avoidance	E1	E2	E3	-	E1	-
Object Containment	E1	E2	E3	-	E1	-

# Swarm FMEA conclusions

- Counter-intuitively, partial robot failures are much more serious than complete robot failure
  - dead robots are simply regarded by the swarm as objects in the environment to be avoided
- One mission-critical failure mode: motor failure
  - because it anchors the swarm, hindering movement toward the object to be contained
- Possible remedies:
  - robot's monitor own motor status, or
  - bio-inspired swarm auto-immune response

# FSM with hazards...?




# Swarm Reliability Modelling

- Modelling the reliability of a swarm appears straightforward, since it consists of  $N$  identical agents operating in parallel
  - For a parallel system of  $N$  robots with independent probability of failure  $p$ , reliability  $R$
  - $R = 1 - p^N$

# Multi-state reliability


- however, FMEA shows us that individual agents could be in partially failed states thus, for our case study
  - $R = (1 - p_1)^N - p_6^N$
  - where  $p_1 = P(H_1)$  and  $p_6 = P(H_6)$
- but emergent swarm behaviours require as least  $K$  operational agents
  - thus reliability modelling requires a *multi-state k-out-of-n* approach

# Testing the Swarm



# Testing the swarm

- We need to
  - establish robust measures for achievement of desired (emergent) behaviours, then
  - define (statistical) test for these measures




$V_s$  – Mean swarm velocity toward target

$Q_e$  – Mean quality of encapsulation

$R_e$  – Mean radius of encapsulation


Frequency that  $Q_e > Q_{\text{threshold}}$  in a given time period for given starting conditions

# Swarm Tests in progress





# Swarm tests can provide an *environment* for single robot test



# A roadmap towards swarm engineering

- Substantial work is needed before dependable swarms can become reality
  - We need to extend and strengthen analytical approaches to modelling of swarm systems
  - We need to extend and strengthen formal approach to provably stable intelligent control
    - To include safety as well as liveness
  - We need a more principled approach to the design of emergence
  - We need to start work on 'safety' analysis at the swarm level
  - We need to develop metrics, methodologies and practices for the testing of swarm engineered systems

# Discussion

- But... can or should we really think about classical approaches to system validation in the context of swarm engineering?
  - some in classical safety systems believe the standard approach is already breaking down for very complex (conventional) systems
  - perhaps a new engineering paradigm calls for new approaches to dependability?

# Conclusions

- A swarm engineering approach to the design of large-scale distributed systems could lead to systems with very high levels of intrinsic fault tolerance, and scalability but *without special effort by the system architect*